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GOSSIP, THE OFFICE AND 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
by 
Jerome O'Callaghan, *Rosemary Hartigan,"* and 
Paula O'Callaghan *** 
"If you want to be absolutely literal, all human life is speech. Every time a 
person goes to work all he does is speak. Or write. Or listen to other 
people speaking. Or eat lunch." 
- Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer1 
" ... gossip is a valuable aspect of free speech." 
-C. Edwin Baker2 
rNTRODUCTION 
In 2007 four employees of the town of Hooksett, New 
Hampshire, were fired for gossiping about a suspected 
romantic liaison between their boss, the Town Administrator, 
and a recently promoted town employee. The dismissed 
employees, all female, became known as the Hooksett Four.3 
The Hooksett Four sued the town and identified themselves 
publicly, giving numerous interviews in local and national 
media.4 The Town of Hooksett responded by issuing a public 
'Associate Dean, Arts and Sciences, Associate Professor of Political Science, State 
University ofNew York at Cortland. 
" Professor and Director, Business and Executive Programs, Graduate School of 
Management and Technology, University of Maryland University College. 
'" Assistant Professor, Business and Executive Programs, Graduate School of 
Management and Technology, University of Maryland University College. 
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statement explaining and defending the town's actions in firing 
the four, 5 and subsequently settled with the two plaintiffs who 
had filed suit in federal court.6 
Although the cases associated with the Hooksett Four did 
not make it to trial, they raise interesting questions about the 
status of gossip as a category of protected speech under the 
First Amendment in the context of public employment. Private 
employers are generally immune from liability for abridging 
the free speech of employees, but the obligations/risks of a 
government employer are less clear. This review serves to 
illustrate the limitations of Supreme Court free speech doctrine 
as applied to this deceptively important category of speech. 
WHAT IS GOSSIP? 
A review of social science and management literature and 
numerous court cases indicates that there is much variation in 
the definition of"gossip." However, paraphrasing Justice 
Stewart Potter's famous comment -- about another much 
maligned and discredited form of communication, --
pornography-- despite the difficulty of defining it, most of us 
know it when we see or hear it; 7 or, at least, we think we do. 
Hearsay, rumor, and gossip are related concepts. Often in 
common usage, the three terms are equated. All involve 
communication of derivative information (to a second party or 
parties) originally obtained from a third party. Segregating 
rumor from gossip involves very fine distinctions, for example: 
"Rumor's foundation is lack of evidence -- without regard for 
topic; gossip specifies the topic -- the moral doings of humans -
- but ignores its factuality. "8 While gossip usually involves an 
arguably inappropriate disclosure of information, the 
information it conveys may be factual. 9 
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The subject of this paper is, specifically, workplace gossip, 
which Kurland and Pelled define as "informal and evaluative 
talk in an organization, usually among no more than a few 
individuals, about another member of the organization who is 
not present. "10 They note that The American Management 
Association distinguished "the grapevine" from gossip, 
asserting that the former may involve a wide range of topics, 
but gossip is focused on information about people. 11 
For more than 100 years courts have taken notice of 
"gossip" in their opinions, but mostly in a dismissive manner, 
frequently using the phrase "mere gossip" in reference to 
hearsay statements that are not admissible for evidentiary 
purposes. 12 ln the cases we examined where gossip (or rumor) 
was central in an employment action, most of the courts did not 
attempt to define gossip. Rather, they examined the operative 
definitions of prohibited behavior specified in the employers' 
written policies. 13 In a few cases, the courts relied on the same 
dictionary definition. ln Dillon v. Twin Peaks Charter 
Academy, 14 the court found it necessary to define "gossip" in 
an employment action suit where the academy's code of 
conduct prohibited "malicious gossip and similar activities" but 
gave no definition in the code. The judge in Dillon, consulting 
several dictionaries, provided this definition: "Gossip" is 
defined consistently ... as "idle talk" or "rumor," "especially 
about the affairs of others.'tl 5 The Court in Fitzgerald v. 
Stanley Roberts, Inc. 16 relied on this same definition in a case 
involving the admissibility of gossip (as hearsay). 
In this paper we limit our discussion of gossip to talk (which 
includes all forms of communication) about the affairs of 
individuals. We will not apply the dictionary definition, 
because the term "idle" makes general, commonly held, 
assumptions about the purpose and intent of gossip that are not 
always supported in fact. Rathe·r, we will apply Kurland and 
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Pelled's value-neutral definition: "informal and evaluative talk 
in an organization, usually among no more than a few 
individuals, about another member of the organization who is 
not present." 17 
GOSSIP IN THE OFFICE - MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
Formal and informal communication networks exist in all 
organizations. Formal communication networks are created to 
manage the content, flow and frequency of information 
throughout the organization. 18 Methods of formal 
communication may include meetings, newsletters, 
employee handbooks, and official company policies. Existing 
in parallel to, and supplementing the formal communication 
network, informal communication networks, commonly 
referred to as "the grapevine," spring up in all organizations. 
These informal networks are neither planned nor sanctioned by 
management, and depending on circumstances, may support or 
conflict with the employers' formal networks. 19 Gossip is 
widely recognized as a pillar of informal communication 
networks in organizations, but it has received surprisingly scant 
attention in management or organizational literature. 20 
Employers often view gossip as eroding employee cohesion 
and discipline, stealing time, and creating a work environment 
replete with unreliable information, innuendo, backstabbing, 
and distrust. Commentators2 1 have noted that "popular" 
business literature tends to promote an overly simplistic and 
negative view of gossip, ignoring its potential benefits in 
. . 22 orgamzat10ns. 
The literature we examined presents a more balanced view, 
recognizing the positive and negative potential of gossip in 
organizations. Several authors noted that gossip serves a 
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valuable role in sustaining community/organizational norms, 
values, and morals, which are not always conveyed adequately 
through formal communication avenues. 23 Often small 
groups are more effective at regulating this type of behavior 
before it comes to the attention of the formal hierarchy and has 
a larger impact on the organization. 24 
In a study of four organizations, Hafen contends that gossip 
may promote positive "organizational citizenship behaviors" 
that benefit the organization or "workplace deviance 
behaviors" that undermine organizational efforts. 25 Gossip can 
have positive effects on an organization by communicating 
rules, values, morals, and organization tradition and history, 
thus facilitating group cohesion. Hafen discusses how 
management can benefit from some gossip, i.e., it can be 
transformed into useful information for organizational 
regulation when it is relayed to someone in authority in the 
organization. In this vein gossip about company "heroes" and 
"anti-heroes" serves as a "kind of social control. "26 Of course, 
gossip is also used in organizations to resist and undermine 
authority. Hafen found that gossip is used to resist regulation, 
"debunking implicitly the organizational creed of placing 
efficiency and productivity over human relations. "27 
GOSSiP IN THE OFFICE - LEGAL ISSUES 
An employee discharged on the basis of originating or 
spreading gossip may be incredulous that such ubiquitous 
behavior can be legal grounds for termination. As one 
reviewer put it, "[G]ossip ... appears to be a normal and 
necessary part of life for all but the rare hermit among us."28 
One study estimated that as much as 80% of human 
communication could be classified as gossip.29 
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Although there are not many judicial opinions concerning 
employees who have been terminated purely on the basis of 
office gossip, gossip has been cited as one of the grounds for 
termination in at least ten fully litigated cases in the United 
States in the past twelve years.30 These are cases where 
published opinions are available. No doubt there are many 
more instances, such as the Hooksett Four cases, where the 
parties settle before triae 1 and incidents where terminated 
employees do not sue at all.32 Of course, gossip also can be a 
form of informal resistance for employees in lieu of, or prior 
to, pursuing formal grievance or legal redress. 
There are several legal approaches available to fired-for-
gossip plaintiffs to challenge their termination including the 
public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine 
under the common law, the employment discrimination statutes 
or hostile work environment theories, and the abridgement of 
free speech constitutional guarantees. With the common law 
and statutory theories having been explored in a prior paper, 33 
the focus of this paper will be constitutional theories based on 
free speech. 
The First Amendment Issue 
While private employers are generally immune from 
liability for abridging the free speech of employees, that 
immunity does not necessarily extend to the governmental 
employer. A government employee retains the option of 
invoking the First Amendment, to allege that government has 
punished speech protected by the Constitution. 
In the routine discussion of speech protected by the First 
Amendment, gossip is a category that receives scant attention. 
The heavy hitters in this area generate significant case law, law 
review comment, complex theories and ever-expanding hard-
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cover casebooks. These are the categories that test the 
boundaries; they include defamation, sedition, obscenity, 
religious speech and commercial speech. Assuming one is not 
an absolutist, the business of understanding the free speech 
guarantee is the business of drawing boundaries around the 
concept of free speech. 
Van Alstyne has analyzed different approaches to 
understanding those boundaries, particularly categories of 
speech that are either included or excluded from First 
Amendment protection. 34 In his review he identifies several 
frameworks that include a sliding scale of protection for 
various categories of speech. Political speech is usually under 
the "most protected" category, while criminal speech occupies 
the "least protected" zone. In between lie categories such as 
"private," "social," "aesthetic" and "scientific" speech. 35 The 
fact that political speech garners the most protection is not hard 
to explain - for many the key to the value of the free speech 
guarantee is its contribution to American democracy. 36 
Gossip is not explicitly addressed in Van Alstyne's analysis. 
Nevertheless gossip may be encompassed by the "social" or 
"private" categories. As government regulation rarely reaches 
the social/private, the issue is not one that draws a lot of case 
law or commentary. Nevertheless it is worth noting that in the 
Van Alstyne scheme, gossip might be deserving of a relatively 
high degree of protection. 37 If gossip can be shown to 
inform/instigate the exposure of corruption in government, then 
it would appear to veer toward political speech, requiring the 
most protection. The question of gossip's place in the strata of 
protected categories remains open, depending in large part on 
the words and their context. 
At the level of the Supreme Court, litigation dealing with the 
free speech rights of public employees came to the fore in the 
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1950's and 1960's. 38 In Pickering v. Board of Education 
( 1968) the court set new standards regarding the free speech 
rights of public employees. 39 Pickering was a school teacher 
who had written to a newspaper criticizing the school board 
and the superintendent. He was subsequently fired. On appeal 
the Supreme Court held that his free speech rights had been 
violated: " ... absent proof of false statements knowingly or 
recklessly made by Pickering, a teacher's exercise of his right 
to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish the 
basis for his dismissal from public employment. "40 
Pickering was predicated on a balancing of interests: "The 
problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the 
interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon 
matters of public concern and the interest of the State, as an 
employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it 
performs through its employees."41 
Subsequent decisions about the firing of public employees 
have come out of the Pickering mold. Over the course of thirty 
years the Court has considered a string of cases involving the 
firing of teachers, a nurse, two assistant district attorneys, and a 
deputy constable.42 The Court has had the opportunity to 
explain the criteria that establish "matters of public concern" 
(Connick and Rankin),43 the burdens on both sides (Doyle and 
Rankin),44 speech conducted specifically in pursuance of job 
duties (Garcetti),45 and the role of the courts in relation to the 
"facts" that might justify a termination (Waters). 46 
Garcetti, the most recent Supreme Court decision to address 
the issue of public employee free speech, has generated a 
significant debate about the reach of the First Amendment.47 In 
Garcetti the Court held that employee speech made pursuant to 
official duties receives no First Amendment protection. A 
government employer is free to "exercise ... employer control 
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over what the employer itself has commissioned or created. "48 
As gossip of any kind, and more particularly the Hooksett kind, 
is never commissioned by an employer, the Garcetti ruling is 
too narrow to address the problems created by gossip. 
In Waters v Churchill, the word "gossip" is never used to 
describe a conversation between two nurses on a break at work. 
The employer's allegation was, however, that part of the 
conversation concerned negative comments about the 
plaintiffs supervisor who was out of earshot at the time. The 
Court found that the reason for the plaintiffs dismissal was 
unclear and therefore it was unable to determine if the speech 
for which she was tern1inated was protected speech.49 
Nevertheless, Waters reveals the Court, in a plurality opinion, 
leaning heavily toward deference to the employer's perception 
of harm in the workplace. Sachs' review of this opinion 
summarizes the key points: 
Although some speech may not be disruptive 
and may possibly be of value, the plurality 
noted that the Court has consistently declined 
any questioning of decisions made by 
government employers on matters regarding 
employee speech. 
All this notwithstanding, the plurality stated that 
the First Amendment should not necessarily be 
absent from all government employer decisions. 
... [I]t is often the government employee who 
knows best the possible problems that plague 
the particular agency for whom he or she works. 
Where this is the case, the employee may have a 
strong interest in airing his or her views on 
public matters. In such a situation the employer 
would have to make a "substantial showing that 
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the speech is, in fact, likely to be disruptive 
before it may be punished." 
.. .. [T]he plurality concluded that employer 
decision-making would not have an onerous 
burden placed on it by having courts "look to 
the facts as the employer reasonably found them 
to be." 
.... Even if [the employee's] speech addressed a 
matter of public concern, the potential 
disruptiveness of the speech as reported "was 
enough to outweigh whatever First Amendment 
value it might have had."50 
While the Court's doctrine has shifted/evolved over time, 
the focal point remains some "issue of public concern." In all 
but one of these cases the government employees expressed 
concern over particular policies and/or individuals in 
management; there is a bona fide belief that errors have been 
made that are detrimental to the workplace. The nurse 
complained about a policy that she believed threatened patient 
care (the exact nature of her complaints remained in dispute 
throughout the litigation); the assistant district attorney 
inquired (via an office survey) about transfer policies and 
political pressure on prosecutors; the college professor publicly 
disagreed with the Board of Regents over school policy; and 
the school teacher disputed the Board of Education's fiscal 
policy decisions. At first glance there is little in these examples 
that overlaps with our conception of gossip. However the gap 
between complaints about office policy and gossip about 
employer behavior will in some cases, like Hooksett, be very 
hard to discern. 
For the Supreme Court, two criteria are paramount: a) if the 
speaker, as a citizen, addressed a matter of public concern, and 
b) whether the employee's interest in expressing gossip 
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outweighs any injury the speech could cause to the 
government's interest, as employer, in the 
of the public services it performs through 1ts employees . 
Fired-for-gossip cases are rare in the federal courts. Waters 
might be an exception to that rule, but even in Waters the 
relevance of gossip to the employer's action is disputed. A 
recent attempt to equate a ban on workplace gossip to prior 
restraint failed in the District Court. When a public school 
employee was fired for gossip, the court found as a matter. of 
law that, " ... a prohibition against 'gossip' cannot support a First 
Amendment prior restraint claim ... " 52 In state courts, 
employees in disputes involving gossip have 
unsuccessful. Courts in Rhode Island and OhiO have ruled m 
favor of government employers on a variety of grounds in two 
cases where gossip was an element of the dispute. 53 It should 
be noted that in neither case did the employees invoke free 
speech rights. 
One can readily imagine circumstances where the First 
Amendment claim is central in a public employment dispute. 
Returning to the Hooksett Four dispute described supra, we see 
a well-balanced clash between gossiping public employees and 
town officials. In a public statement on the Hooksett 
Four, 4 the Town Council noted that the town "suffered from a 
lack of management continuity for at least four years" with six 
different individuals in the Town Administrator's office over a 
four-year period. It further noted that some of 
administrators cited "serious personnel problems." In additiOn, 
the statement noted that the incidents of gossip were sparked 
when a woman who was one of the subjects of the gossip 
worked extra hours in the short-staffed Finance Department. 
Had the Hooksett Four raised a federal free speech claim 
they would have encountered the issues that have dominated in 
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federal cases since Pickering: 
a) did the employee speak as a citizen on a matter of 
public concern? 
b) did the employee's interest in the expression of gossip 
outweigh any injury the speech could cause to the 
government's interest, as an employer, in promoting the 
efficiency of the public services it performs? 
The first question should be answered in the affirmative. As 
the gossip concerned the public employees' legitimate interest 
in a situation where another employee may have been 
improper! y promoted (or compensated), the reason for the 
gossip involves a nascent issue of public interest involving 
possible corruption, misuse of public funds, conflict of interest 
and violation of ethics laws. This is all the more important 
given the history of "serious personnel problems" in the office. 
The second part of the test, requiring a balancing of 
interests, is more difficult to gauge. Is the interest of the 
Hooksett Four in discussing this issue valuable enough to 
justify any injury the speech could cause to the town's 
promotion of the efficiency of the public services it performs 
through its employees? From the Town Council point of view, 
the gossip was entirely false and very damaging. 
"[T]he issue was not one of idle gossip, but a 
conscious and concerted effort to damage 
reputations, to spread untrue stories with the 
knowledge that they were not true and evidently 
to retaliate for some perceived preferential 
treatment. The rumors, were they believed 
credible, could have been cause for removal of 
the Administrator and could have formed the 
basis for a sexual harassment suit against the 
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town. Furthermore, the rumors were also 
intended to create tumult in the ranks; evident 
from a phone call that was placed to the home of 
d. l I , 55 the employee who was out on me tea eave. 
From this perspective the injury is grave and the effort to 
"create tumult" in the workplace hinders the efficiency of 
public service. Is that injury sufficient to outweigh the interest 
of the gossipers in airing the allegation? 
Given that, in most employment situations, neither side is 
certain of the truth at the time the gossip is communicated, the 
balancing of interests becomes extremely context-sensitive. In 
predicting how courts will read that balance of the 
Waters decision reveals a distinct preference for valumg the 
employer's interest. The Court held in Waters, that 
" ... employer decisionmaking will not be unduly burdened by 
having courts look to the facts as the employer reasonably 
found them to be."56 [emphasis added] 
The Court, in Waters, did not consider the role of gossip as 
a means of fact-finding in the workplace. Refuting the 
common belief that gossip leads to unreliable information, 
Ayim defends gossip as a mode of inquiry with similar 
standards of fact-finding as those applied in science.57 Hafen 
finds that "to gossip is to both contest and wield power, 
authority, and discipline."58 Indeed, gossip may be the only 
means for some individuals who have little power in the formal . . f1 59 organization structure to obtam and assert m uence. 
The following hypothetical situation will serve to 
how seemingly "trivial" gossip could deserve the protectiOn of 
the First Amendment. Imagine that in January 2008 employees 
in the office of New York Governor Elliot Spitzer have begun 
to discuss the possibility that he has a mistress. Some 
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employees are aware of questions that are being raised by his 
advisors about mysterious accounts and expenditures. The 
gossip includes references to a woman visiting the Governor's 
hotel room during an out of town trip. None of the employees 
are aware of any ongoing criminal investigation. Learning 
about this gossip, the Governor's chief of staff fires an 
employee who had admitted to spreading the rumor. Several 
months after the firing, the Governor resigns in disgrace when 
the press reveals his relationship with a prostitute. 60 
With the benefit of hindsight it is easy to say that the 
employees were exercising free speech rights in a manner that 
was admittedly detrimental to the career of one governor, but it 
was also in fact to the benefit of the state and the office of the 
governor. In hindsight we know that the employees were on to 
something close to the truth. The difficulty is that, at the time 
of circulating the gossip, the employees had no way to tell how 
true the allegations were. No doubt there is a lot of gossip in 
most places of employment, gossip that circulates with no 
factual basis, and some of it has negative consequences for the 
integrity or the efficiency of providing public service. It is in 
that context that supervisors, such as the chief of staff, have to 
make a decision about the impact of gossip in the workplace. 
CONCLUSION 
Gossip is a difficult case. On one hand it relates easily to 
traditional understandings of the purpose of the free speech 
guarantee. Free speech fosters democracy and gossip is a 
democratic form of speech. 1n some contexts, gossip is an 
embryonic representation of issues that will come to fruition as 
corruption allegations or sexual discrimination/harassment 
allegations. Hence, the connection to "matters of public 
concern," governance, and politics matters. Free speech also 
fosters discovery of the truth - and the role of gossip in relation 
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to whistle-blowing activities is doubtless substantial. Finally, 
free speech is critical to self-realization. Gossip serves a key 
function in our networks (in and out of the workplace) and 
helps define our personalities and our values. On the other 
hand, the destructive impact of gossip is recognized time and 
again by courts as giving rise to a significant employer interest. 
The application of the Pickering test adds another layer of 
difficulty. Rutherglen refers to the "uncertainty inherent in the 
balancing test" and concludes that "[t]oo few rights leave 
public employees as second-class citizens and the public itself 
uninformed about how the government actually operates. Too 
many rights risk paralyzing the operation of government itself 
as dissenting employees claim their right to speak out against 
policies that they have a duty to implement."61 There is, 
however, a way to protect more employee speech under current 
doctrine. The courts should begin to demand more specific 
evidence of the harm done by employee speech. Mere 
reference to "promoting efficiency" is no match for 
demonstrating a diminishment of service to the public. That 
approach would put more bite in the Pickering test and serve to 
foster the First Amendment rights of employees. 
In light of the most recent Supreme Court decisions, we see 
significant skepticism in the courts about the protection 
employee speech in general and gossip in particular, more so m 
the case of public employment. The inevitability of gossip in 
complex organizations has not deterred the courts in giving 
leeway to employers who wish to punish it. 
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